Lessons from a laissez-faire payments system: the Suffolk Banking System, 1825-58 - commentary by Randall S. Krosner






ne of the key challenges for central
bankers today concerns the regulation
and operation of the payments system.
Faced with rapid innovation in informa-
tion-processing and communications tech-
nologies, central banks are struggling to
understand what role, if any, they should
play in the payments system of the future.
These fundamental questions have prompt-
ed researchers to examine how payments
systems evolved in the period before central
bank control, seeking insights into how pri-
vate alternatives might operate (e.g., Mul-
lineaux 1987; Gorton and Mullineaux
1987; Cowen and Kroszner 1989, 1990, and
1994; Selgin and White 1994; Calomiris
and Kahn 1996; and Kroszner 1996 and
1997).  In this spirit, Rolnick, Smith, and
Weber’s article in this issue (RSW) evalu-
ates the Suffolk System, which is perhaps
the most important private clearing
arrangement to have developed in ante-
bellum America.
RSW challenges the sanguine view
that the Suffolk System demonstrates how
the unregulated market will provide an
efficient payments system.  It provides
new evidence that the profitability of the
Suffolk Bank was greater than that of
other banks in Boston and Massachusetts
and that Suffolk Bank had a dominant
role in the interbank borrowing and
lending market.  The authors then raise
the possibility that this evidence suggests
that the market would provide a “natural”
monopoly in payment services.  While I
will question whether the Suffolk experi-
ence can address the monopoly issue, I
believe that RSW has given us a new and
important direction in historical research
on payments systems, namely understand-
ing the link between clearing arrange-





To make the case about natural mono-
poly, RSW begins by observing that for
more than two decades, no competitor
emerged to challenge the Suffolk Bank’s
note-clearing business in New England
(see also Lake 1947).  Next, the article
examines the proﬁtability of the Suffolk
Bank for evidence of monopoly rents.
Since the data that would allow us to calcu-
late returns on assets or equity do not exist,
RSW uses data on dividend payments rela-
tive to capital as a proxy for proﬁtability.
Calomiris and Kahn (1996) used dividend
payment rates to compare the average prof-
itability of banks in Boston with those in
other cities during this period and found
that banks in Boston did not pay higher
dividends than banks elsewhere.  On
average, these banks do not appear to have
enjoyed supernormal proﬁts.  RSW exam-
ines the proﬁtability of individual banks in
detail and ﬁnds that, from 1834 until 1858,
the dividend rate for the Suffolk Bank was
consistently higher than for other banks in
Boston as well as for the smaller banks in
the rest of Massachusetts.
The authors then investigate what might
account for the relatively high dividends for
the Suffolk Bank.  In doing so, they provide
an extremely important and original contri-
bution to the literature.  They document the
dominant role of the Suffolk Bank in the
interbank borrowing and lending market.
The Suffolk Bank was not only the largest
holder of interbank deposits, as might natu-
rally be expected of the note-clearing agent,
but also the largest interbank lender, as the
authors have shown in an earlier work (Rol-
nick, Smith, and Weber 1997).  The Suffolk
Bank thus appears to have been more than
simply a note-clearing agent; it also
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1 RSW argues that Suffolk’s
apparently high return was not
compensation for risk because
dividend rates did not drop
below those of other Boston
banks in any year throughout
the period.  We do not have
direct data on the annual prof-
its, losses, and cash ﬂows.  The
relatively steady and high divi-
dend rate, however, might
mask underlying volatility, since
dividends can be paid out of a
surplus accumulated precisely to
smooth returns to shareholders.
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appears to have been a major source of liq-
uidity in New England.  The increase in
Suffolk’s proﬁts coincided with the expan-
sion of its interbank lending role. 
This evidence, RSW argues, suggests that
there are economies of scope in the provision
of clearing and liquidity services.  Suffolk’s
detailed information about the health and
activities of member banks, gleaned from
operating the note-clearing system, may have
reduced its costs of monitoring loans to other
banks.  The information advantage Suffolk
gained from note clearing led to its dominant
role in the interbank funds market.  Recently,
a number of authors have argued that this
complementarity is theoretically important
(e.g., Gilbert  1993, and Rajan forthcoming),
but RSW provides the ﬁrst empirical documen-
tation  of such a linkage.  Scope economies
can be used as an efﬁciency rationale for
having the lender of last resort operate the
payments  system.
It would be extremely valuable to know
whether Suffolk was effectively acting as a
lender of last resort.  During the Suffolk Sys-
tem era, banks in New England were more
stable than in other parts of the country
(Calomiris and Kahn 1996):  Bank failure
rates and loss rates to depositors were lower
in New England, in both normal times and
during the bank panics of the late 1830s and
1857.  As the authors documented in Rol-
nick, Smith, and Weber (1997), interbank
lending by the Suffolk Bank rose during the
crises.  Were the interbank activities of Suf-
folk a key contributor to the stability of bank-
ing in New England?  To whom did Suffolk
lend during the crises, and on what terms?
What risk exposure was the Suffolk Bank
willing to incur?  Could higher average
returns be related to the insurance role that
Suffolk may have been playing?1 A fascinat-
ing possibility to explore in future research
is whether and how well the markets pro-
vided stability through a clearinghouse
that was acting as a lender of last resort.
MONOPOLY: NATURAL OR
UNNATURAL? 
While RSW’s inquiry has shed new
light on the relationship between
payments and liquidity services, the evi-
dence does not necessarily imply that
Suffolk enjoyed a “natural” monopoly or
that there is a tendency for the market to
produce such a monopoly.  A monopoly is
“natural” if, for a given market size, eco-
nomies of scale (and possibly scope) are
sufﬁciently strong that production costs
are minimized when there is a single pro-
ducer.  That producer then can drive out
all competitors in the market and obtain a
monopoly.  As RSW acknowledges, natural
monopolies do not necessarily result in
socially inefﬁcient use of resources, but
they raise that possibility (see Edlin, Epel-
baum, and Heller 1996).
The Suffolk System, however, did not
operate in a completely unregulated envi-
ronment, and regulation may have increased
the costs to potential competitors and the
heights of entry barriers.  The difﬁcult task
is to untangle which regulations, if any, are
relevant to the development of the Suffolk
System and what impact they had on its
operation.  Although I will not attempt such
a full-scale evaluation here, I will mention
some potentially important considerations.
First, the Suffolk System received some
special legislative support.  As RSW notes,
Vermont gave tax breaks to banks that
joined the Suffolk System.  In addition, Mas-
sachusetts did not permit banks to pay out
to their customers’ notes of other banks,
thereby providing an incentive for banks 
to use the Suffolk System for note clearing.
Such government encouragement may have
helped to increase the proﬁtability of the
Suffolk Bank and deter new entrants.
Second, despite the frequent use of 
the term “free banking” to describe mid-
nineteenth century banking in the United
States, entry into the banking industry was
far from free.  Bank charters required an act
of the state legislature.  By 1850, only Rhode
Island had passed a “free banking” statute.
This statute eased, but did not make “free,”
entry into banking in that state.  Only after
Massachusetts passed its free banking sta-
tute in 1851 was a coalition of banks able to
obtain a charter for what became the Bank
for Mutual Redemption (BMR), the bank
that triumphed over Suffolk in 1858.  FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
119
MAY/JUNE  1998
RSW argues that the key to the BMR’s
success is that, unlike other challengers to
Suffolk, it was owned by its member banks,
and this cooperative structure helped to
reduce the obstacles to coordinating a com-
peting network of member banks.  Twenty
years earlier, however, a group of country
banks had tried to obtain a charter from the
Massachusetts state legislature for a banker’s
bank that would provide a competitor to
the Suffolk System (Lake 1947).  The pro-
ponents of the Suffolk Bank killed the bill,
and no bank owned by other banks was
permitted a charter until the BMR.  Suffolk
was long protected from mutual organiza-
tional forms with different cost structures
that might have undercut Suffolk’s mono-
poly.  Politics, not just economics, thus
appears to play an important role in pre-
venting the emergence of rivals to Suffolk
(Kroszner 1996, and Kroszner and Strat-
mann forthcoming).
Third, and perhaps most important,
were the restrictions on intrastate and inter-
state branching (Kroszner and Strahan
1998).  If no such prohibitions on the
geographic expansion of banks existed, the
payments system might have developed very
differently during this period.  Some banks
may have chosen to operate branches in
major cities and towns throughout a region
or, perhaps, throughout the country (much
like the Second Bank of the United States).
Each branch of a single bank is likely to
have accepted its own notes and checks at
par, regardless of the location of an indivi-
dual branch.  These notes would have
achieved par circulation without reliance on
a common clearinghouse.  One or more of
the widely branched banks might then have
provided clearing services for other banks’
notes to compete with the Suffolk System.
The branching restrictions thus may
have had an important effect on the cost of
producing payment services.  Without
branching, only one par clearing operation
may have been feasible in New England.
With branching, however, other banks
may have faced lower costs of entering the
note-clearing business, so the market may
have been able to sustain multiple clearing
operations.  Also, geographically diversi-
ﬁed banks may have had less demand for
an interbank lending market.  Rather than
rely on other banks for liquidity, well-
branched banks might have been able to
substitute an internal interbranch funds
market for the interbank market.
FUTURE RESEARCH
RSW concludes by proposing a compar-
ative study of payments systems that devel-
oped in different parts of the United States
during the nineteenth century.  Given the
state-by-state variation in regulation, such an
investigation may shed light on the role of
regulation in shaping the Suffolk System as
well as other payments systems.  The authors’
work on the linkage between liquidity and
payments systems continues to break new
ground (Rolnick, Smith, and Weber 1997).
Historical payments system research
also might fruitfully extend beyond the
United States and banking for insights into
what the market might produce.  During
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
many clearing systems emerged in Euro-
pean countries that had little or no ﬁnan-
cial regulation (Cowen and Kroszner 1990
and 1994; Kroszner 1990).  One of the ear-
liest examples, which has received some
attention, is the note-exchange system that
developed in Scotland during the 1760s
(e.g., Munn 1975; White 1984; Cowen and
Kroszner 1992; Kroszner 1997).  In addi-
tion, commodities futures exchanges
developed private clearing and settlement
arrangements during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries (Edwards 1984;
Williams 1986; Moser 1994; Kroszner
1998).  These systems often adopted the
mutual or cooperative form that the BMR
had used successfully against the Suffolk
Bank, so further study of these arrange-
ments might help us to understand how
private payments systems of the future
might evolve.
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